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WRECKING BALL DISGUISED AS LAW REFORM:
ALEC’S MODEL ACT ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
DEE PRIDGEN∞
ABSTRACT
The consumer protection statutes of every state are currently under attack
by a proposed model law that would effectively eliminate the critical private
enforcement provisions that give these laws their power. The American
Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”) has produced a purported law reform
vehicle that is actually a wrecking ball to destroy one of the building blocks of
consumer protection, namely the private enforcement of state unfair and
deceptive practices statutes. ALEC’s proposed law does this by systematically
weakening each provision of the current consumer protection laws, such as
those providing for lower burdens of proof for consumer plaintiffs, special
damages, and attorney’s fees, that were designed to give consumers access to
justice for small economic wrongs. This article examines the history and goals of
the state consumer protection statutes, with their private enforcement
mechanisms. It then critiques the arguments and flawed studies put forward in
support of weakening the private right of action. Finally, in a section-by-section
analysis, the article demonstrates how the ALEC model act differs from current
law and would, if passed, undermine the original goals of these state statutes.
The article concludes that the ALEC model legislation is an ill-conceived
attempt to effectively repeal the private enforcement of state consumer
protection statutes.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
State consumer protection statutes are under attack.1 In the guise of state law
reform, influential business-funded think tanks led by the American Legislative
Exchange Council (“ALEC”) have begun a campaign to effectively abolish the
private right of action to enforce state consumer protection statutes.2 Their shiny
new weapon is a model law that, if enacted in any state, would effectively
eliminate consumers’ right to sue for a violation of that state’s consumer
protection laws. Although ALEC and others have presented this law as a modest
“reform,” this article shows it is in fact aimed at gutting a particularly useful and
long-standing type of consumer protection, thereby shielding businesses from
liability for unfair or deceptive trade practices. While critics have raised some
legitimate issues regarding current consumer protection laws, their proposed
solutions go beyond the justifications offered, and turn back the clock to the days
of “caveat emptor.” In short, the ALEC Model Act on Private Enforcement of
Consumer Protection Statutes (the “ALEC Model Act” or “Model Act”) purports
to suggest a few modest repairs, while aiming a wrecking ball at consumer
protection statutes, a move that would be a disaster for the average consumer
seeking justice in the marketplace.
State lawmakers should be extremely wary of the ALEC Model Act and
similar proposals, which are loaded with provisions that undermine consumers’
existing rights. Legislators, and their constituents and lobbyists as well, should
consider the history and policy behind the existing state consumer protection
statutes, which have resulted in years of successful consumer protection cases.
This article attempts to provide such a perspective.

1. These statutes are also referred to in this article as state unfair and deceptive acts and
practices (“UDAP”) laws, state little FTC acts, state consumer protection laws or state consumer
protection acts.
2. See Paul M. Barrett, Business Gears Up for Assault on Consumer-Protection Laws,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles
/196333-business-gears-up-for-assault-on-consumer-protection-laws.
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Part II provides a historical introduction to the current landscape of state
consumer protection laws. I assert that one of the central goals of these statutes is
the establishment, through private rights of action, of a cadre of “private
attorneys general” to supplement government enforcement and provide access to
the courts for small consumer claims that might otherwise not be adequately
addressed.3 Part III discusses the arguments and studies put forward in support of
the ALEC model with its diminution of the private right of action, and concludes
that they are seriously flawed.4 Part IV analyzes and critiques the provisions of
the ALEC Model Act, which is at the heart of the movement to diminish the
effectiveness of the laws discussed in Part II.5
II.
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF STATE UDAP LAWS: HISTORY & POLICY
State consumer protection statutes (commonly referred to as state unfair and
deceptive acts and practices or “UDAP” laws) originated in the late 1960s and
early 1970s as a way to expand the consumer protection policies and powers of
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to the state level. These laws extended
enforcement power to consumers filing private suits in state court in order to
supplement the enforcement efforts of the federal and state governments through
the use of “private attorneys general.” The drafters of this private right of action
aspect of the state laws also sought to help individual consumers with relatively
small claims gain access to justice through the court system.6 The various model
laws on which the state UDAPs were based featured provisions that specifically
carried out these goals. This Part discusses, in turn, each aspect of the history
and policy of private enforcement of state UDAP laws.
The state UDAP statutes, enforced by private suits, stemmed from the plight
of consumers seeking justice in the 1960s. Prior to the enactment of the state
UDAP laws, consumers were legally protected only by resort to weak common
law causes of action in tort or contract and by the intervention of the FTC, a
relatively limited alternative.7 The FTC’s limitations are rooted in its own
history. The FTC had been on the scene since 1914, with a specific mandate to
protect consumers against “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” since 1938.8
The FTC is an independent regulatory agency run by a five-person commission

3. See infra text accompanying notes 6–74.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 75–113.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 114–71.
6. See William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724
(1972).
7. The limitations of the common law tort and contract actions by individual consumers are
discussed infra Part I(b).
8. Federal Trade Commission Act, 45 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). For a general history of the
FTC, see Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
761 (2005).
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that enforces the FTC Act through an administrative process.9 Traditionally, the
FTC could sue merchants for deceptive practices that had a “tendency or
capacity to deceive” “the ignorant, and the unthinking and the credulous.”10 The
FTC also has the authority to prohibit “unfair” trade practices.11 The FTC has
been and remains constrained, however, by a duty to take action only if it is in
the public interest and affects interstate commerce.12
The FTC Act itself has never featured a private right of action to enforce the
federal prohibition against unfair and deceptive trade practices, and the courts
have been unwilling to infer one.13 Based on the legislative history of the FTC
Act, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the leading case of Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers reasoned that Congress favored public enforcement by an expert
agency that could try to educate businesses, seek voluntary compliance, and
issue prospective remedies, such as cease and desist orders.14 The Holloway
court also expressed concern that private lawsuits to enforce the FTC Act, with
its broad mandate to curb “unfair and deceptive trade practices,” would result in
“piecemeal” rulings by state court judges who might not be constrained by the
overall enforcement goals of the FTC itself.15
A. Expanding FTC Enforcement Through Private Attorneys General
The drafters of the state UDAP laws envisioned them as a way to fill the
void left by both the limited capacity of the FTC and the restricted scope of state
common law. The FTC actively encouraged enactment of state UDAP laws as a
way to expand efforts to protect consumers during a time when the Commission
itself was being attacked as weak and inefficient.16 Then-FTC Commissioner
Paul Rand Dixon stated in the late 1960s that the Commission was seeking to
facilitate a “cooperative effort with state and local officials in order to increase
protection of the consuming public from unfair and deceptive commercial
9. The FTC has both an antitrust and a consumer protection mission. Id. at 761–62. This
article focuses on the latter.
10. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963). In 1983, the FTC issued a
policy statement that changed the definition of “deceptive trade practices” to “material
representations, omissions, or practices that are likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably
under the circumstances.” FTC Policy Statement on Deception, § 1 (October 14, 1983), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception.
11. This prong of the FTC’s jurisdiction was rarely used until the 1970s and 1980s, however.
See In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984) (one of the first major FTC cases applying the
FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, later codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)–(b).
13. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
14. Id. at 998–1000.
15. Id. at 997.
16. See, e.g., EDWARD COX, ROBERT FELLMETH & JOHN SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE
FTC (1969) (commonly known as the “Nader Report”). See also Report of the ABA Commission
to Study the FTC (1969), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. Supp. (BNA) No. 427, at 49–55
(Sept. 16, 1969).
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practices.”17 He also said that the Commission was “continuing to work closely
with the Council of State Governments in the development of a model Unfair
Methods and Deceptive Practices Law for the states,” which he believed “would
greatly assist the effort to reach local unfair trade practices on a uniform basis.”18
While it first seemed that state laws would rely on the enforcement powers
of the state governments alone, the need to also utilize private litigants
eventually became clear to both state legislatures and their allies in the state and
federal governments. The incorporation of private rights of action to the state
UDAP laws took place gradually, mostly occurring during the period of 19701980.19 In 1969, the state attorney general of Massachusetts said that while state
attorney generals’ offices could provide expertise and manpower to enforce
consumer protection statutes, “another significant step would be the
implementation of an effective private consumer remedy.”20 He noted that with
an effective remedy for private litigants, the public would see
. . . a host of new consumer protectors: the lawyers of the
Commonwealth. It was, after all, primarily the failure of the
legal system to provide adequate remedies that led to the great
consumer movement of the past decade with the resultant deluge
of new laws. Here is an opportunity to affirm the principle that
government should do only what the people cannot do for
themselves, by placing in the private sector the power to obtain
redress for consumer frauds.21
Former FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection Director, Albert H. Kramer,
similarly expressed his support for a private right of action to enforce state
UDAP laws. In a 1979 speech, Kramer said:
As the federal role changes, the need for private actions
becomes all the greater. If states, because they are closer to the
people, can be more responsive and tailor remedies to individual
areas better than the federal government can, individual
consumers are even better at that. Also, obviously, there is an
even greater deterrent effect on wayward businesses.22
17. Paul Rand Dixon, Government, Consumers and Retailers: Togetherness or Conflict, 4
NEW ENG. L. REV. 75, 77 (1969).
18. Id.
19. See Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or
Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 522 (1980); DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER
PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 6:2, and sources cited therein (2014–2015 ed.).
20. Robert H. Quinn, Consumer Protection Comes of Age in Massachusetts, 4 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 71, 72 (1969).
21. Id.
22. Albert H. Kramer, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the State Bar of Texas
Consumer Law Section, An FTC Rite for Private Rights: Federal and Nonfederal Role in
Consumer Protection (June 27, 1979) (on file with author).

PRIDGEN_9.13.15_FINALFIXED_AN&CG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

284

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

9/15/15 12:07 AM

Vol. 39:279

Thus, one major goal of these state “little FTC Acts” was to supplement the
enforcement activities of the FTC by enlisting the help of a potentially large
cohort of consumer victims or “private attorneys general” empowered to bring
their own cases by virtue of the private right of action under the state laws.23
Indeed, the use of private enforcement mechanisms as an extension of
administrative agency regulation is a hallmark of the American regulatory
system that is by no means unique to the FTC and its complementary state
consumer protection acts.24 The federal antitrust laws, for instance, provide for
private enforcement under the Clayton Act, with treble damages and attorney’s
fees.25 This provision has been so successful that ninety-five percent of all
antitrust cases are brought by private plaintiffs.26 Most federal environmental
protection statutes also have provisions for “citizen suits” to supplement
government enforcement.27 The statutory framework for consumers seeking a
remedy for unfair or deceptive trade practices is unique, however, in that the
FTC prohibition against unfair or deceptive trade practices relies on state
statutory enactments that indirectly apply federal law, rather than a direct private
right of action in the federal statute. The state laws known as “little FTC Acts”
use the wording of the federal FTC Act and include a private right of action in
state court. Most of the state statutes provide that FTC jurisprudence will guide
state courts applying state consumer protection statutes, giving the FTC
continuing power over the states’ definitions of “unfair and deceptive” trade
practices.28
This indirect expansion of the enforcement of the FTC Act through a private
right of action under state law, rather than by federal enactment or court
implication of a private right of action under the FTC Act itself, came about for
practical reasons. At the time, the courts were adamant in refusing to imply a
private right of action under the FTC Act.29 In addition, Congress had not
attempted to amend the FTC Act in this regard because in the period after these
state laws were enacted, the political force of the consumer movement at the
federal level had ebbed.30 Rather than waiting for either the courts or Congress to
23. The term “private attorney general” has a continuum of meanings, but as used here, it is
the concept that private lawsuits can supplement the enforcement activities of a federal agency,
such as the FTC. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why
It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2147 (2004).
24. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
26. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 16.1 (4th ed. 2011).
27. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 192.
28. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 3 app. 3B.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
30. MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, REVOLT AGAINST REGULATION: THE RISE AND PAUSE OF THE
CONSUMER MOVEMENT 73 (1982).
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move forward, the state legislatures filled the gap. Thus, the indirect extension of
the FTC’s consumer protection mission through the state UDAP statutes is wellestablished, and therefore unlikely to change unless state statutes are amended.
Given this important role of the private right of action under the state UDAP
statutes, attempts to undermine this enforcement avenue could be highly
destructive to consumers’ access to justice.
B. Giving Consumers Access to Court
The second major goal of the state UDAP private right of action was to give
consumers meaningful access to the courts for relatively small claims against
merchants who engaged in unfair or deceptive practices. Prior to this
development under state law, consumers could in theory sue merchants who
defrauded them under common law tort theory, but the consumer was required to
prove the merchant’s false representation of fact (rather than opinion) and intent
to deceive, as well as her own justifiable reliance.31 This was quite
burdensome.32 The element of justifiable reliance was especially difficult for the
average consumer to overcome, because many judges at that time believed that
buyers and sellers were on the same footing with regard to information about
products, and that the buyer had a duty to question and seek independent
verification for any important statements or opinions of the seller.33
Under the common law of contracts (in tandem with the Uniform
Commercial Code), consumers could also try to persuade judges to refuse to
enforce contracts based on misrepresentations,34 or unconscionable provisions.35
However, plaintiffs rarely succeeded in consumer cases using a contract lawbased approach. A merchant could limit his or her liability for
misrepresentations by including an “as is” clause in the contract, for example.36
Also, voiding a contract based on unconscionability was typically reserved for
practices that were both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, a

31. The elements of the cause of action for common law fraud (also called “deceit”) have
been stated by Prosser and Keeton as including: false representation (not omission) of fact (not
opinion) made by the defendant; knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the
representation is false; intention to induce the plaintiff to act; justifiable reliance upon the
representation on the part of the plaintiff; and resulting damage to the plaintiff from such reliance.
W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984) (describing elements of cause of action for common law
fraud or “deceit”).
32. See, e.g., Parker v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 295 N.E.2d 487, 490 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (finding
that false representations of plaintiff’s supposedly exceptional dancing ability were not actionable
because “mere expression of opinion will not support an action for fraud”).
33. See, e.g., Williams v. Rank & Son Buick, Inc., 44 Wis. 2d 239 (1969) (holding that
dealer’s representation that a car had air conditioning was not justifiably reliable because plaintiff
had had an hour and a half to look at the car).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162–64 (1979).
35. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
36. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Scott, 533 So. 2d 241 (Ala. 1988).
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relatively high bar for most consumer plaintiffs.37 In addition to the difficulty of
proof, the contract approach provided only a way to avoid contract enforcement,
but did not provide damages to the defrauded or unfairly treated consumer.38
In addition to the high burden of proof for individual fraud claims, the high
cost of litigation itself stymied consumer cases involving relatively small claims.
Most consumer goods are not so expensive that the injury to the consumer of
having been misled as to its value (purely economic loss) would justify the
expense of hiring an attorney and going to court.39 Thus, it became apparent to
state legislatures enacting UDAP statutes that consumers needed a mechanism to
attain access to justice for their relatively small, and individually costly to
litigate, claims against merchants and other marketplace participants.40
C. Sources and Provisions of State UDAP Laws
In order to fulfill the objectives discussed above, i.e., to expand the
enforcement of FTC consumer protection policies, and provide individual
consumers with access to viable remedies for unfair or deceptive trade practices,
state legislators drafted their UDAP laws with reference to a number of different
model acts. Mainly three bodies—the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL,” now known as the Uniform Law Commission
or “ULC”), the American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the Council of State
Governments—developed these model acts. NCCUSL was established in 1892
to provide states with “non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation
that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.”41 It is
state-supported and consists of commissioners appointed from each state.42 All
commissioners are members of the bar and are practitioners, judges, or law
professors.43 They receive no salaries or fees for their work.44 NCCUSL has

37. See, e.g., Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. 1971). See
also Williams v. Walker-Thomas, 350 F.2d 445 (establishing test for unconscionability of
consumer contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code).
38. Under contract law, damages are a remedy for breach of contract, whereas the remedy for
a contract that was based on misrepresentation or that contains unconscionable provisions, would
be to rescind the contract or the offending provision only. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 376 (1979). In a consumer sales situation, consumers who were victims of deception or
unfairness would typically not be pleading a breach of contract (except perhaps for breach of a
warranty), but instead would be alleging the contract was a result of deception or unfairness. See
U.C.C. § 2-302 (2014) (providing for non-enforcement of unconscionable contracts or contract
clauses).
39. See David A. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Transactions Problems, 48 B.U. L. REV. 559, 569 (1968).
40. See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 19, at 546–53.
41. About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx
?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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promulgated many model and uniform laws that have been published and made
available to state legislatures for recommended adoption.45 The ALI was founded
in 1923 by a group of prominent American judges, lawyers and teachers “to
promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to
social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to encourage and
carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.”46 The ALI is best known for its
work on the Restatements of the Law. Both NCCUSL and ALI conduct their
work in a relatively open manner and attempt to maintain a non-partisan and
balanced approach to their work. Where they err, they have been perceived to err
in favor of business; some writers have accused the model code drafting process
of shutting out consumer advocates, particularly during the emendation of
Article Two on sales of the Uniform Commercial Code.47 The NCCUSL has
worked with the ALI on certain projects, such as the Uniform Commercial Code,
perhaps the most successful model or uniform law in the United States. Both
NCCUSL and ALI have been called “mainstream” legal organizations whose
drafts, proceedings and model laws (as well as other projects) are widely
available to researchers.48 The Council of State Governments is a non-partisan
non-profit organization funded by states that provides information and ideas for
state legislatures, executive offices and state courts. It was founded in 1933.49
The Council of State Governments does not actually draft legislation but reviews
proposals for publication in its annual Suggested State Legislation.50
NCCUSL issued the first model state consumer protection law, the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, in 1966.51 The law listed eleven specific
deceptive practices.52 When NCCUSL’s model law proved too competitionoriented to have much bite in consumer cases, a second model law gained
traction—the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act adopted in 1971 by
NCCUSL and the ALI. The jointly produced Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act, however, was adopted in only three states, namely Kansas, Ohio and Utah.53

45. See generally ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF THE
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION app. E (2013), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared
/Publications/ULC%20History%20Book/Forming%20a%20More%20Perfect%20Union.pdf.
46. Certificate of Incorporation, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (1923), available at
http://www.ali.org/doc/charter.pdf.
47. See Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will Articles 2,
2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69 (1997).
48. Mary Whisner, There Oughta Be a Law—A Model Law, 106 LAW LIBR. J. 125, 126–28
(2014) (noting that both ALI and NCCUSL are part of the “legal establishment”).
49. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, http://www.csg.org/about/default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 28, 2015).
50. Id. at 130.
51. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1966). This Act was withdrawn from
recommendation for enactment by NCCUSL in 2000 due to it being obsolete.
52. Id.
53. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, § 2:10.
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The FTC, in collaboration with the Council of State Governments,
developed the prevalent model for state consumer protection laws. This was the
Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, issued initially in 1967,
and amended in 1970. Most state consumer protection laws are based on this
model law in one of three variations. The first variation is truly a “little FTC
Act” that incorporates the FTC Act’s broad prohibition on “unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The second variation
leaves out the prohibition against unfair practices. The third alternative, known
as the “laundry list,” enumerates thirteen prohibited practices and provides a
“catch-all” prohibition against “any other practice that is unfair or deceptive.”54
A few states enacted Consumer Fraud Acts, which prohibit deceptive or
unconscionable acts or practices and fraud.55 Using these various model laws for
guidance, within a few years every state had passed such a state consumer
protection statute, and over time almost all of them featured a private right of
action.56
By incorporating the elements of the FTC Act into state laws that included a
private enforcement mechanism, these laws allowed consumers to draw from the
FTC’s enforcement actions and guidance in pressing their own claims.57
Lowering the legal bar was not enough, however, to get consumer cases through
the courtroom door. In addition, most state statutes that included a private right
of action also provided attorney’s fees paid by the defendant to the prevailing
consumer plaintiff.58 This type of provision, called statutory fee-shifting,
replaces the normal “American rule” that each party in a lawsuit must bear its
own costs, including attorney’s fees.59 The rationale for the fee-shifting
provisions of the consumer protection statutes is that the damages in most
consumer cases—e.g., the loss in value on the used car purchased from a dealer
where the car did not live up to the claims made about it—would not be enough
to cover the average cost of an attorney to represent the consumer in court. If the
default “American rule” applied, consumers would not bring even meritorious
cases to court because the recovery would not cover their litigation costs and the

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 16–22.
57. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 399 (N.C. 1981) (holding that “federal
decisions interpreting the FTC Act may be used as guidance in determining the scope and meaning
of” North Carolina’s UDAP statute); Comm. by Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa.
450, 329 A.2d 812, 818 (1974) (holding that since the FTC Act covered residential leasing
practices, the state consumer protection law modeled on the FTC Act did likewise).
58. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, app 6A. There are some variations in the
provisions for attorney’s fees under the state statutes, with some states leaving the award to the
discretion of the court, and others making it mandatory for prevailing consumer plaintiffs. Some
states also provide for fee awards to prevailing defendants, usually in cases where the suit was
frivolous, brought in bad faith, or harassing. Id.
59. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993).
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consumer injury would go uncompensated and undeterred. If consumers and
their attorneys could not afford to go to court, the “private attorneys general”
aspect of private enforcement would be eliminated.
Statutory minimum or multiple damages are also a common feature of state
UDAP statutes. Statutory minimum damages are meant to provide some type of
recovery even in cases where the injury to the consumer is more difficult to
prove, such as the damage from purchasing an item that is not as valuable as
represented in some difficult-to-quantify way, or even responding to an
advertisement without purchasing anything. For instance, consumer plaintiffs in
Hawaii who were “baited” by a deceptive advertisement for an automobile
financing deal recovered the minimum statutory damages despite the fact that
they did not actually purchase a vehicle, but simply wasted their time pursuing
the elusive bargain.60 Statutory minimum damages range from $50 to $2,000.61
Multiple damages, either double or triple, are modeled on the treble damage
provisions of the federal antitrust laws, specifically the Sherman and Clayton
Acts.62 This type of provision is another way to make an individual consumer
action more economically feasible even if the amount of actual damages is
relatively small. Statutory damages can also increase the deterring effect of an
individual suit.63 For instance, in a Kansas case a creditor who used an unfair
(and unenforceable) clause in a consumer credit contract had to pay $2,000 in
penalty damages to the consumer.64 A Kentucky car dealer who sold the
potential buyers’ trade-in vehicle prior to the approval of financing, and who
committed various misrepresentations in negotiations with the inexperienced
customers, was subject to $50,000 in punitive damages under the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act.65 In a West Virginia case, in which a creditor was
found liable for using unfair debt collection practices, the state Supreme Court
approved an award of civil penalties totaling over $30,000.66
While critics of the state consumer protection statutes, with their lower
burdens of proof and added remedies, may be concerned about the potential
flood of litigation they may spawn, it should be noted that such statutes are
usually limited to consumer plaintiffs in the context of consumer transactions.67
The theory was that consumers needed this additional legal boost because they
60. Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 98 Haw. 309, 47 P.3d 1222 (2002).
61. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, app. 6A.
62. Section 4 of the Clayton Act reads as follows: “[A]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
63. For a recent discussion of the arguments for and against the deterrent effect of punitive
and statutory damages in the context of tort law, see Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence,
75 ALB. L. REV. 181 (2011–2012).
64. Thomas v. Leaseland U.S.A., 790 P.2d 964 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
65. Craig & Bishop, Inc. v. Piles, 247 S.W.3d 897, 900–01 (Ky. 2008).
66. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Cole, 740 S.E.2d 562, 573 (W. Va. 2013).
67. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 4 app. 4A.
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are not on the same footing as the businesses with which they deal. Businesses
dealing with other businesses were presumed to have equal resources to hire
attorneys and negotiate at arm’s length for favorable contract terms. While some
states have extended coverage under their state UDAP statutes to business
plaintiffs, especially small business plaintiffs,68 the general rule remains that
these special laws are for the benefit of consumers only, in line with the original
objectives of these laws, as discussed above.69
Over the years since their inception, the state UDAP statutes, with their
private rights of action, have been instrumental in achieving justice for
consumers. The litigated cases have been numerous, numbering in the thousands
each year, with some states such as Texas, Washington, Massachusetts, and
California, being particularly active.70 Many of the litigated cases decided under
the state consumer protection laws have been catalogued in reference books,
although an exact count has not been attempted.71 Clearly, however, FTC
consumer protection cases are still pursued, and consumer cases under the state
UDAPs have increased, thus increasing the total number of cases that work
toward fulfilling the deterrence and compensation goals of the drafters of the
state UDAP statutes. In numerous cases individual consumers have been able,
thanks to the state UDAP statutes, to gain legal representation, go to court, and
be compensated for their injury, all the while providing legal precedents and
strong remedies that are hoped to deter similar violations.
In addition to individual cases, many class action suits have been approved
under state consumer protection statutes in situations where individual cases,
even with the advantages of the state UDAP laws, might not have been pursued
due to the small stake of each individual consumer.72 This class action vehicle
has benefited consumers in many states. Class actions can compensate individual
class members, and deter unfair or deceptive practices. Nonetheless, consumer
class actions, both in the state UDAP context and in other areas of law, such as
tort cases, have come under criticism as being excessively burdensome to
68. See, e.g., Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 310 (Minn. 2000) (viewing individual
purchaser of a small business as a “consumer” for purposes of applying the state Consumer Fraud
Act, although concluding that he was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the state’s “Private
Attorney General” statute because it was an isolated transaction).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 16–41.
70. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, § 3:1, n.1.
71. See, e.g., id. at ch. 3–7; CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR &
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (8th ed. 2012).
72. As the New Jersey Supreme court put it early on,
The subject of consumer fraud has emerged as a major problem of our
commercial scene. . . . If each victim were remitted to an individual suit, the
remedy could be illusory, for the individual loss may be too small to warrant a
suit or the victim too disadvantaged to seek relief. Thus the wrongs would go
without redress, and there would be no deterrence to further aggressions. If
there is to be relief, a class action should lie unless it is clearly infeasible.
Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Center, 294 A.2d 7, 10 (N.J. 1972) (approving use of class action suit
under the state consumer fraud act).
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businesses and excessively beneficial to the class action attorneys.73 As a result,
in the last two decades, consumer class actions have been subject to significant
legislative reforms as well as limited through the use of class action waivers in
consumer contracts.74
These critiques of class actions join critiques of the individual private right
of action to prop up the model law being promoted by ALEC, a proposed piece
of legislation that will, if passed, undermine the very foundations of the private
right of action under the state UDAP statutes. In the next part, I discuss the main
objections that have been voiced by critics of private suits under state UDAP
laws and demonstrate the flaws in these justifications for cutting back or
eliminating the existing private right of action under state UDAP statutes.
III.
FLAWED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALEC’S MODEL ACT
If state legislatures were to pass the ALEC Model Act, or even certain
aspects of it, they would be doing so in response to the criticisms of state UDAP
private enforcement that have mounted over the past decade regarding alleged
increases in private UDAP litigation.75 In this Part, I examine several of the
arguments raised against the status quo of private enforcement of state UDAP
statutes. First, critics argue that decisions by state courts in private consumer
cases are unpredictable and go beyond what the FTC would do, and thus are
unfair to businesses trying in good faith to obey the law. Second, a Searle Civil
Justice Institute study claimed to find that increasing consumer protection
litigation would increase the prices of consumer products, such as automobile
insurance. Third, the American Tort Reform Foundation has argued that the use
of lower burdens of proof and enhanced remedies for consumer plaintiffs under
the state consumer protection laws has resulted in an unwarranted increase in
litigation that benefits professional litigators more than it protects consumers.
Each of these critiques is considered in turn below.
A. State Courts Not Following FTC?
First, critics allege that recent state court consumer protection decisions
have gone beyond the initial impetus to make litigation under state “little FTC
Acts” an extension of the efforts of the overburdened FTC. Thus, the argument
goes, rather than supplementing FTC enforcement of an established law of unfair
and deceptive trade practices, private litigants have persuaded receptive state
courts to overshoot the mark and have gone well beyond the initial goal of filling
73. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action
“Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1441 (2005).
74. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions and making it
easier to remove class actions filed in state court). See also infra text accompanying notes 109–13.
75. As shown in this Part, the sources that claim a large increase in UDAP private
enforcement are subject to question. See infra text accompanying notes 98–99.
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the gap of cases that the FTC might have brought had they had sufficient
resources.76
A 2009 study by the Searle Civil Justice Institute, a conservative think tank
based at Northwestern University School of Law, provides the main empirical
support for this argument.77 This project assembled a random sample of state
appellate court consumer protection decisions from a database encompassing
thousands of such decisions from all fifty states and the District of Columbia
decided between 2000 and 2007.78 These decisions were then summarized and
presented to a “Shadow FTC” composed of five still unnamed individuals said to
include persons with substantial experience at or with the FTC Bureau of
Consumer Protection.79 The case summaries were presented to the “shadow
FTC” who concluded that seventy-eight percent of the sample state UDAP
claims would not be considered unfair or deceptive under FTC policy
statements, and that thirty-eight percent of the successful claims at trial would
not constitute illegal conduct under the FTC standards.80 From this data, the
authors concluded that the recent state consumer protection decisions that were
studied went beyond “filling the gap” of cases that the FTC would have enforced
had they had the resources to do so.81 They also concluded that the statutory
standards for defining unfair and deceptive practices under the state laws were
too vague and that the litigation provisions were too consumer-friendly, leading
to an increase in private consumer protection litigation over the study period of
2000-2007.82
The use of empirical research to support calls for public policy reform is
usually helpful and should be welcomed by policy-makers.83 In this case,
however, the research methods and the resulting report are questionable. For
76. Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really LittleFTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163 (2011). Note that since the publication of the cited article, author
Joshua Wright was appointed and confirmed as one of the five Federal Trade Commissioners. See
www.ftv.gov/about-ftc/commissioners.
77. JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
OF PRIVATE LITIGATION (2010) (preliminary report of the Searle Civil Justice Institute’s 2009
study), available at http://www.masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/CPA%20Prelim%20Report
%20Dec%202009.pdf [hereinafter Searle Shadow FTC Report]. The study is also summarized and
analyzed in Butler & Wright, supra note 76.
78. Searle Shadow FTC Report, supra note 77, at 15–16.
79. Id. at 35.
80. Id. at 49.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 16–30 (explaining that the FTC and others supported
the idea of state UDAPs and private enforcement because the FTC alone did not have the
capability of litigating all the potential unfair and deceptive trade practices that merited action, thus
creating an enforcement “gap”).
82. Searle Shadow FTC Report, supra note 77, at 49–50.
83. At least one author, however, has questioned the ability of judges and lawyers to use
empirical research to inform policy judgments due to their lack of training in or knowledge of
scientific methods. See David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207
(2006).
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instance, the “shadow FTC” members, whose decisions form the basis for the
claim that most of the cases brought in state courts under state UDAP statutes
would not have been brought by the FTC, are never identified, and no reason is
given for this secrecy. Thus, it is impossible for scholars to determine whether or
not those individuals were qualified or perhaps biased in their decisions. Also,
the opinions of the “shadow FTC” members are little more than hypothetical
conjecture. This is at best subjective evidence, and not objective fact, since the
FTC did not actually review or decide any of the cases that were involved in the
study. Second, the database of cases, i.e., the random sample of cases chosen and
the summaries used, were also never released. Only two examples were given,
and the specific cases on which they were based were not identified. Thus, it is
impossible for others to try to replicate or critique the results. It is a basic tenet
of scientific research that researchers should make their data available to others
to confirm their analysis and results.84 It is also a disservice to policy makers to
put forward research based on a subjective opinion survey, and present it as
empirical findings.
The ALEC Model Act (as discussed in the next Part) addresses the issue of
state courts straying from FTC law by reducing or effectively eliminating private
suits. This is unnecessary because most of the state UDAP laws already refer to
FTC jurisprudence for guidance, and the state courts applying these laws have
adhered to this statutory directive as best they can.85 Because this principle of
reference to FTC jurisprudence is embedded in most state laws, the defendants in
state UDAP cases could use (and have used) FTC precedent in their own
defense.86 Thus, it is not clear that there is a need to cut back on consumers’
access to the courts under the state UDAP laws based on an alleged straying
from FTC jurisprudence, since adherence to FTC law is already incorporated
into most state laws.
The Searle Shadow FTC Study is also off the mark because, while these
statutes were indeed modeled on and sanctioned by the FTC when they were
originally passed, they are still state laws. The state legislatures and courts are
technically free to go beyond what the FTC has or would do. The fact that some
states may choose to be guided by, but not bound by, FTC precedent is not
necessarily a fault, but may be a virtue in allowing the states to address
consumer issues unique to their constituents.87 Also, in our federal system of
84. PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION § 1.08 (6th ed.
2010) (“Data Retention and Sharing”).
85. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 3 app. 3B.
86. See, e.g., State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 709 (Wis.
1988) (using FTC “bait and switch” guidelines to buttress its conclusion that the practices cited in
the state’s complaint did not violate Wisconsin law).
87. See, e.g., ASRC Energy Servs. Power & Commc’ns, LLC v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n,
Inc., 267 P.3d 1151, 1161 (Alaska 2011) (applying the traditional FTC standard for unfairness,
rather than an updated one, to avoid overturning state court precedents and because they did not
want to use a standard that might result in “less protection for Alaska consumers and business
people”).
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government, states have long been seen as public policy “laboratories,” where
new ideas could be tested on a small scale prior to being adopted in federal
law.88 Some variations from FTC policy may in fact be a healthy sign of the
evolution of consumer protection.
B. Consumer Protection Litigation Raises Prices?
Another study by the Searle Civil Justice Institute, released in 2012,
purports to show that the proliferation of private enforcement under state
consumer protection acts has led to an increase in automobile insurance
premiums.89 This is another example of a flawed empirical study that could be
used to influence state legislatures considering cutbacks in their state UDAP
statutes. First, the study looks only at the costs of litigation under state consumer
protection acts. It does not even purport to look at the benefits to the consumers
who brought the cases, and other consumers who may benefit from the deterrent
effect on unfair and deceptive practices. Also, the study is said to measure the
impact of state consumer protection liability on the costs of automobile
insurance. It does this by showing a correlation between the changes in the laws
and the costs of the insurance. Correlation does not, however, necessarily equal
causation. Second, the singling out of the cost of automobile insurance is rather
striking in that many state consumer protection statutes specifically exempt
insurance matters from their coverage on the basis that insurance is already a
state-regulated industry.90 In other states, insurance has been exempted by state
court interpretation under a general statutory exemption for regulated
industries.91 Thus, the impact of private enforcement of state consumer
protection laws on insurance prices would be indirect at best, since in many
states the insurance company could not be sued directly under these laws. Also,
litigation involving automobile insurance providers is just one small part of the
overall litigation under consumer protection statutes, and litigation costs may
represent only a small part of the costs of providing insurance.
The Searle automobile insurance cost study was done by analyzing the
provisions of the state laws, identifying statutory amendments promulgated over
88. For instance, prior to the FTC adoption of a rule virtually abolishing the “holder-in-due
course” doctrine from consumer credit transactions, some forty states had enacted their own
legislation on the subject. Federal Trade Commission, Trade Regulation Rule, Preservation of
Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,506, 53,508
(Nov. 18, 1975).
89. SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, LAW &
ECONOMICS CENTER, STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS AND COSTS TO CONSUMERS: THE IMPACT
OF STATE CONSUMER ACTS ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PREMIUMS (2011), available at
http://www.masonlec.org [hereinafter Searle Auto Insurance Study].
90. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, §§ 4:28–29.
91. See, e.g., Wilder v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 433 A.2d 309 (Vt. 1981); Taylor v. S.
Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 954 So. 2d 1045 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007); Ferguson v. United Ins. Co. of
Am., 293 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Britton v. Farmers Ins. Group, 721 P.2d 303 (Mont.
1986).
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a period of time that would encourage or discourage potential plaintiffs from
filing suit, and then constructing a Consumer Protection Acts Index (“CPA
Index”) that would supposedly track a plaintiff’s willingness or ability to file suit
over time.92 Changes in the CPA Index for each state were then correlated to
changes in automobile insurance premiums in the state to determine the impact
of different consumer protection act provisions on automobile insurance
premiums by state over time.93 While the state statutes themselves are public
information, the study’s analysis and scoring of the various provisions of each
state law was presented in summary form, making it difficult to evaluate the
soundness of the analysis. For instance, one of the attributes that made up the
index was whether or not the statute required a “public interest impact” for a
private cause of action.94 Yet this aspect, or something like it, may be read into
the law by court decision and might not be apparent on the face of the statute.95 It
appears from the description of the Searle Auto Insurance Study that the Index
was compiled by looking only at the language of the statutes, and did not
examine state court interpretations.
C. Too Much Litigation?
The third justification for cutting back on the private right of action under
state UDAP statutes is that the laws have somehow morphed from being
consumer protection statutes into “consumer litigation statutes” exploited by
unethical attorneys.96 One article notes that between 2000 and 2007, state

92. Searle Auto Insurance Study, supra note 89.
93. Id.
94. See id. (listing “Does the CPA require a ‘public interest impact’ analysis for a private
cause of action?” among the attributes surveyed). See also id. at 32 fig.14 (listing “CPA Has Public
Interest Requirement” among variables).
95. Compare, e.g., Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 647
N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) (requiring that challenged business practices be “consumeroriented”—i.e., plaintiffs “must demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broader impact on
consumers at large”), with N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2012) (“Deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in
this state are hereby declared unlawful.”). Compare also Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 234 (Colo.
1998) (“While the public interest component is longstanding, we now recognize that a more
precise reading of the statute’s function requires an impact on the public as consumers of the
defendant’s goods, services, or property.” (internal quotations omitted)), with COLO. REV. STAT. §
6-1-105(1)(a) (2014) (“A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of the
person’s business, vocation, or occupation, the person: (a) Knowingly passes off goods, services,
or property as those of another . . . .”).
96. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW UNHINGED 7 (2013),
available at http://atra.org/sites/default/files/documents/CPA%20White%20Paper.pdf (“In the
absence of an explicit distinction between public enforcement and private lawsuits, courts in some
states have interpreted consumer protection statutes to simply extend the broad authority of the
attorney general or state consumer protection official to private lawyers with their own agendas.”).
See also id. at 3 (“The Problem: Plaintiffs’ lawyers have become the primary beneficiaries of state
consumer protection laws. While settlements provide consumers with no more than a few dollars,
the lawyers who invent such cases get millions in fees.”); JOANNA M. SHEPHERD-BAILEY, AM.
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appellate courts saw a forty-three percent increase in the volume of litigation
under these state laws, and federal courts saw their decisions triple in size.97
Whether the increase in cases is a sign that the statutes are finally being used to
consumers’ benefit, or a sign that there is “too much litigation” cannot be
determined merely by looking at such broad statistics. One possible reason that
cases may have increased is that it took a long period of time for consumers and
their advocates to realize their potential. In 1980, one commentator noted, “the
value of UDAP statutes in private consumer protection litigation has been
severely underestimated.”98 In 1989, another scholar noted that state UDAP
statutes potentially affected some core contracts doctrines, but had gone largely
unnoticed, especially by contracts scholars.99
Now that state UDAP litigation appears to have increased in popularity, thus
having some bite in the affected business sectors, the critics and the ALEC
Model Act support new legislation to eliminate or hamstring the pursuit of
private litigation. There is no need to undermine the state UDAP laws, however,
even if some cases truly are out of line. Overreaching lawsuits will remain few,
and are unlikely to cause much long-term damage to business, because they are
heavily policed under the current statutes. State court judges can and do interpret
and apply their own state laws in such a way as to avoid expansions not
authorized by the state legislature. These judges play an important role in
guarding against abuses, and are not hesitant to intervene. For instance, some
state courts have inferred a “public interest” requirement to rein in overzealous
litigation.100 Some courts have also read a “reasonable reliance” standard into the
applicable state consumer protection act.101 Twenty-eight states’ statutes contain
an explicit reference to the need to adhere to “guidance” by the FTC’s policy on

TORT REFORM FOUND., CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS OR CONSUMER LITIGATION ACTS?—A
HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF STATE CPAS 4, available at http://atra.org/sites
/default/files/documents/Shepherd-Bailey%20White%20Paper%20-%20FINAL_0.pdf (last visited
Mar. 28, 2015) (“But in recent decades, this tradition of incremental change and thoughtful
balancing has given way to surprising legislative and judicial overcorrections with a common
theoretical mistake: the notion that additional consumer protection litigation necessarily protects
consumers more.”).
97. Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An
Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2010) (citing Searle Auto Insurance Study,
supra note 89, at 36–40).
98. See Leaffer & Lipson, supra note 19, at 522.
99. Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and
Teaching vs. State Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26
HOUS. L. REV. 575, 575 (1989) (“Contracts teachers have paid little attention to unfair and
deceptive trade practices acts and consumer protection statutes.”).
100. See supra cases cited in note 95.
101. See, e.g., Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E. 2d 910, 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (“Since the Act
contemplates notice of the deception relied upon as the prerequisite to a suit for recovery of
damages resulting from that deception, we construe [the Georgia UDAP law] as incorporating the
‘reliance’ element of the common law tort of misrepresentation into the causation element of an
individual claim under the FBPA.”).
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unfair and deceptive trade practices.102 Nine states provide for the awarding of
attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party,” so that the consumer could end up
paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees if the case is lost,103 a powerful deterrent
to frivolous suits. More states have a provision to award attorney’s fees to a
prevailing defendant if the court finds that the consumer suit was “groundless,”
“frivolous,” or brought in “bad faith.”104 If state legislatures are concerned about
unfounded lawsuits brought under the state UDAP statutes, these more targeted
measures could be adopted if states do not currently have them in their laws.105
Thus there is no need for the sweeping legislation suggested by ALEC in their
Model Law.
In response to the perception that private litigation under the state consumer
protection laws has increased over the past decade,106 the ALEC Model Act puts
forward a proposed “reform” statute that in fact eviscerates the use of these laws
by “private attorneys general.” This comes at a time when the potential for
consumer access to the courts is being hampered by increasing limits on class
actions, as well as the increasing use and enforcement of arbitration clauses and
class action waivers in consumer contracts.107 Thus, the private enforcement of
state UDAP statutes becomes all the more important for consumers damaged by
unfair or deceptive practices.
Critics of class actions, especially those filed under the state UDAP laws,
have argued that requiring a showing of individualized reliance is necessary to
curb abuses, such as overcompensation of uninjured plaintiffs.108 By definition, it

102. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 3 app. 3B.
103. These states are Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri,
Mississippi and Montana. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, § 6:21, n.2.
104. These states are Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas and Utah. See PRIDGEN
& ALDERMAN, supra note 19, § 6:22, n.2.
105. See, e.g., Matthew W. Sawchak & Kip D. Nelson, Defining Unfairness in “Unfair Trade
Practices”, 90 N.C. L. REV. 2033, 2071 (2012) (“It is time for the North Carolina courts to add
more rigorous content to the standards for unfairness, as the FTC and the courts of several other
states have already done. Specifically, the North Carolina courts should supplement the current
standards for unfairness under section 75-1.1 with the ‘not reasonably avoidable’ test that the FTC
has applied since the 1980 Statement.”).
106. See Butler & Johnston, supra note 97, at 6.
107. See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239
(2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012) (discussing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011)).
108. See, e.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in Abuse
by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance As an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5
(2006) (“Requiring reliance for private suits achieves the proper balance of public and private
resources: allowing government agencies to seek restitution and injunctive relief where there is no
consumer reliance and letting private litigants seek damages where reliance provides a causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury.”). But see Samuel Issacharoff, The
Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1633 (2000)
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may appear that compensating a consumer who cannot prove reliance on a false
claim or cannot prove that they have suffered direct harm from an unfair practice
is a case of overcompensation. Also, if advertisers can be answerable for
misrepresentations that were not actually relied on by all consumers in the
plaintiff class, commercial speech may be chilled.109 Some scholars also argue
that deterrence of deceptive or unfair trade practices can be best achieved by
relying on government agencies alone, such as the FTC and the state attorneys
general, such that the private attorneys general function of bringing consumer
class actions is no longer needed.110
As to the reliance issue, under FTC jurisprudence, on which state UDAP
statutes were based, there is no requirement for showing individual reasonable
reliance on deceptive practices, but rather the standard is an objective showing
that the practice is “likely to mislead the consumers acting reasonably in the
circumstances.”111 Actual consumer injury is not required for FTC actions, and
thus proof of actual injury, reliance, and ascertainable loss for consumer class
actions under “little FTC Acts” should also not be required. Using an objective
standard such as “likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably,” the courts in
consumer class actions under state law can determine whether a practice is
indeed a proper subject for remediation, without the need to burden class actions
unnecessarily with additional showings of fact.
The notion that government agencies should be the sole enforcers of the
prohibition against unfair and deceptive practices, thus eliminating the need for
consumer class actions, is also ill founded. The original philosophical
underpinning of the movement toward consumer class actions was not only to
provide a more efficient and less burdensome gateway to the court system for
injured consumers, but also to harness the resources of “private attorneys
general” to expand enforcement beyond the government and to deter
corporations from engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices.112 In these
days of unrelenting calls for restraints on government spending, both federal and
state, there is no concrete evidence that government consumer protection
resources are any more plentiful today than they were when UDAP class actions
were conceived. The whole point of the consumer class action is to allow a
grouping together of numerous similar small claims against a single defendant,
or group of defendants, in situations where individual lawsuits would be

(arguing that in some situations reliance can be inferred in consumer class actions rather than
proved for each individual plaintiff).
109. Butler & Johnston, supra note 97, at 47–53.
110. Scheuerman, supra note 108, at 33.
111. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, § 10:3; FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
supra note 10. Twenty-two states use the FTC’s traditional “tendency or capacity to deceive”
standard in their state UDAP statues. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 3 app. 3B.
112. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 663, 664 (2008).
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impractical.113 Thus, the move to clamp down on consumer class actions could
mean that such small claims will go un-redressed and mass infliction of small
consumer injuries will go undeterred.
IV.
THE ALEC MODEL ACT ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION STATUTES—A DISASTER IN THE MAKING
A. The Genesis of the ALEC Model Act
The attack on the state UDAP private right of action has been slowly
building up over the past ten to fifteen years. The studies and scholarship
critiqued in Part II of this article tend to prop up the collection of provisions that
constitute the ALEC Model Act. In this Part, I describe the origins of the ALEC
Model Act and the group that promulgated it. This Part also contains a sectionby-section analysis, which describes what each provision would do if enacted
and how it differs from current law, and discusses why each section is ill
founded and unnecessary, as appropriate.
ALEC, formed in the mid-1970s, is an “association for state lawmakers who
share a common belief in limited government, free markets, federalism, and
individual liberty.”114 The membership of ALEC is composed of interested state
legislators (who join for free or for a nominal fee) and “private sector” members
who must pay from $5,000 to $50,000 to join.115 ALEC works mostly behind
closed doors, and was relatively unknown until 2011 when the Center for Media
and Democracy obtained copies of eight hundred of ALEC’s model bills.116
ALEC has been described as “an organization hiding in plain sight, yet one of
the most influential and powerful in American politics.”117
ALEC has formed various task forces that publish reports and issue model
laws on a wide variety of issues, hundreds of which now appear on their public
website.118 There is apparently no means for consumer advocates to participate
in its activities. Only corporate sponsors and legislators are members of ALEC,
113. Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305 (2010).
114. History, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/about-alec/history/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2015).
115. Andrew N. Ireland Moore, Caging Animal Advocates’ Political Freedoms: The
Unconstitutionality of the Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act, 11 ANIMAL L. 255, 258 (2005)
(internal citation omitted).
116. Ellen Dannin, Privatizing Government Services in the Era of ALEC and the Great
Recession, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 503, 506–08 (2012) (citing Lisa Graves, About ALEC Exposed,
PRWatch Center for Media & Democracy, http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/07/10883/aboutalec-exposed (last visited Feb.11, 2015)).
117. United States of ALEC (Moyers & Company Sept. 28, 2012), available at
http://billmoyers.com/episode/full-show-united-states-of-alec.
118. See generally AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org (last visited Feb. 6,
2015).
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and the resulting legislative proposals are, unsurprisingly, rather skewed toward
business interests.119 Recall that by contrast, the state UDAP statutes originated
in model legislation promulgated by either the NCCUSL and ALI, or the FTC in
partnership with the Council of State Governments.120 The model legislation that
ALEC develops is channeled to receptive state legislators who are encouraged to
introduce the model bills in their individual states.121
The Model Act has been in circulation for several years and has a good
chance of being passed in any number of state legislatures.122 One indication of
the growing influence of the Model Act was the amendment by the Tennessee
State Legislature in 2011 of the state Consumer Protection Act to eliminate the
private right of action for all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” other than
those specifically enumerated in the statute.123 This will greatly circumscribe the
breadth of activities that will be subject to private suit under the Tennessee law.
The ALEC Model Act is relatively short and specifically focused on the
private enforcement provisions of the existing state consumer protection
statutes.124 It does not overtly seek to eliminate the private right of action to
enforce state “little FTC Acts.” However, the collection of various requirements
and limitations, if enacted, would have the effect of significantly reducing or
altogether eliminating the level of private enforcement of the existing statutes.125
The Model Act also undermines the original goals of the statutes: it reduces
enforcement of consumer protection laws at the state level through private
litigation, and blocks consumers’ access to the courts for smaller claims. Indeed,
I believe that the Model Act is intended to cripple the state consumer protection
119. See generally Moore, supra note 115 (ALEC proposed Animal and Ecological
Terrorism in America Act to restrain animal rights activists who took undercover video to expose
animal cruelty in corporate farming operations, a bill favored by corporate agriculture. This law or
aspects of it passed in several states.). But see Terry Carter, One Hundred Years of Law, ABA
JOURNAL, Jan. 2015, at 53 (explaining that when ALEC opposed renewable energy laws on the
basis that humans may not be responsible for climate change, a number of large corporations,
including Google and Yahoo, left the organization).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 42–77.
121. See Allison Boldt, Rhetoric vs. Reality: ALEC’s Disguise as a Nonprofit Despite Its
Extensive Lobbying, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 35, 36–37 (2012).
122. See AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL, http://www.alec.org/about-alec/history/ (last
visited Feb. 14, 2015) (ALEC itself estimates that an average of twenty percent of the “close to
1,000 bills, based at least in part on ALEC Model Legislation . . . introduced in the states” each
year have become law.).
123. James M. Davis, Less Protection: Revisions Narrow Scope of Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act, 49-FEB TENN. B. J. 12, 13 (Feb. 2013) (discussing amendments to Tenn. Code
Ann. § 47-18-104).
124. Model Act on Private Enforcement of Consumer Protection Statutes, AM. LEGISLATIVE
EXCH. COUNCIL,
http://www.alec.org/model-legislation/model-act-on-private-enforcement-of
-consumer-protection-statutes (last updated Jan. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Model Act]. It does not
address government enforcement by state attorneys general.
125. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer
Protection Acts, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1, 67–68 (2005) (advocating for the adoption of the ALEC
Model Act because it would limit private actions).
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statutes under the guise of “reforming” them or correcting abuses. It does this in
several ways. It resurrects from common law the outmoded requirement of
individual proof of “reasonable reliance” for consumer plaintiffs, thus increasing
the burden of proof.126 It limits consumers’ damages to out-of-pocket loss, thus
making it impossible for consumers to collect other more expansive types of
damages that were added to make consumers whole in ways that out-of-pocket
damages could not.127 The Model Act effectively eliminates attorney’s fees for
prevailing consumer plaintiffs by requiring an unnecessarily burdensome
prerequisite of showing that the unlawful act or practice was “willful with the
purpose of deceiving the public.”128 These and other aspects of the Model Act
individually chip away at consumers’ rights under existing law, but the sum total
of all the proposed provisions of the ALEC Model Act would result in the
demolition of the private right of action for state consumer protection laws. An
analysis of the potential adverse effects on consumer litigants for each of the
various provisions of the Model Act is set forth in detail below.
B. Section-by-Section Analysis
The Model Act, as published on the ALEC website, does not contain any
section-by-section analysis or present any rationale for the various provisions.
This article will attempt to provide such an analysis, as well as a critique,
beginning first with a discussion of the potential effects of the various aspects of
the Model Act. The analysis is summarized in the table.
Table 1. ALEC Model Law vs. Current Law
Type of Provision
Reliance requirement

ALEC
1(A): individual
“reasonable reliance”
required

Damages for prevailing
consumer plaintiff

1(A) & 1(G): only outof-pocket loss measured
by difference in value

Statutory damages for

1(C), (D) & (E): optional

126. See infra text accompanying notes 129–38.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 147–50.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 159–66.

Current Law
Most states do not
require reasonable
reliance; FTC deception
policy condemns
practices “likely to
mislead consumers acting
reasonably under the
circumstances”
Most states allow actual
damages, as well as
consequential, mental
anguish and sometimes
punitive damages
Most states allow
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prevailing consumer
plaintiff

provision for treble
damages capped at $500

Ascertainable loss

1(A): plaintiff must
suffer “ascertainable loss
of property or money”

Prior notice

1(B): plaintiff must give
defendant ten-day prior
notice before filing suit
1(F): class actions
limited to persons
showing individual
reasonable reliance and
ascertainable loss;
damages limited to outof-pocket loss
2(A): Fees available only
for cases where violation
was “willful” and “with
the purpose of deceiving
the public”
2(B): Fees available only
for suits that were
groundless, brought in
bad faith or harassing
3: One year from date of
discovery and no action
more than four years
after first instance of the
act or practice at issue

Class actions

Attorney’s fees for
prevailing consumer
plaintiff

Attorney’s fees for
prevailing defendant

Statute of limitations

Exemption for regulated
activities

4(A)(1): exempts “acts
or practices required or
permitted by or in accord
with state or federal law,
rule or regulation,
judicial or administrative

Vol. 39:279

minimum damages,
multiple damages, or
both, sometimes only for
willful violations; no
$500 cap
Thirty-four states have
ascertainable loss
provision, but not limited
to loss of property or
money
Eleven states have
similar provision
Normal procedural rules
for class actions

Most states provide
attorney’s fees for the
prevailing consumer
plaintiff, sometimes in
the discretion of the court
Most states have similar
provision

Ranges from one year
(six states), to two years
(ten states) to three to
four years (fifteen states);
no state has limit on suits
brought a certain number
of years after “first
instance”
Most states exempt acts
or practices “specifically
required or permitted by
state or federal law”
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decision, or formal or
informal agency action”
First, under Section 1(A), the private right of action could be asserted only
by a person who “reasonably relies upon an act or practice declared unlawful by
[another section of the state UDAP statute].”129 This language of reasonable
reliance appears to hark back to the common law requirement that a plaintiff
show “justifiable reliance” on the seller’s misstatement. No state consumer
protection statute currently contains such a requirement, although there have
been a few state court cases requiring this or something like it.130
A prerequisite of “reasonable reliance” can make for factual and legal
quagmires about whether or not an individual consumer plaintiff was
“reasonable” to rely on a particular statement or practice. It also increases
litigation costs by adding fact-showing requirements to the consumer’s burden of
proof. For example, how could a consumer prove it was “reasonable” to rely on
a real estate broker’s gross overestimation of the amount for which they could
sell their home?131 Consumers vulnerable to exploitation or fooled by a seller’s
exaggerations or opinions could be precluded from bringing suit altogether, if
not viewed as credibly “reasonable” consumers.132 Also, if a standard form
contract contradicts the salesperson’s oral falsehoods or includes a disclaimer
against reliance on any prior assertion made by a salesperson, the consumer may
lose their opportunity to get redress for even a deliberately false statement,
because it may be deemed “unreasonable” to rely on such an oral statement
contradicted or denied by the written contract.133 Unfortunately, it is well known
that consumers do not read standard form contracts and are not likely to notice a
contradiction of an oral representation in the written contract.134
Some may try to defend ALEC’s proposed requirement of “reasonable”
reliance by all consumer plaintiffs as simply a reference to the FTC Deception
Policy, which defines a deceptive act or practice as one that is “likely to
129. Model Act, supra note 124.
130. See, e.g., Toy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 186 (Pa. 2007); Zeeman v. Black, 273
S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
131. See Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 483, 429 N.E.2d 1267 (1981) (finding for
the consumer, despite fact that reliance on opinion would be considered unreasonable or
unjustifiable under common law).
132. See Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268 (1977) (holding that New York’s
consumer protection law protects vulnerable consumers and not just the average person).
133. See Wiegand v. Walser Auto. Groups, Inc., 683 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2004) (applying the
Minnesota consumer protection act and rejecting the argument that reliance on oral statements was
unreasonable because of a contradiction in the written contract).
134. Consumer behavioral studies find that average consumers routinely disregard contract
statements that contradict oral assurances made by a trusted figure, such as a salesperson. See, e.g.,
Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths
Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 681 (2009); Jessica M.
Choplin, Debra Pogrund Stark & Jasmine N. Ahmad, A Psychological Investigation of Consumer
Vulnerability to Fraud: Legal and Policy Implications, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 61, 65 (2011).

PRIDGEN_9.13.15_FINALFIXED_AN&CG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

304

N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

9/15/15 12:07 AM

Vol. 39:279

mislead” a consumer “acting reasonably under the circumstances.”135 However,
there is a major difference between a statutory requirement that an individual
prove reasonable reliance as a prerequisite to private suit and the FTC policy
defining a deceptive practice. Neither the FTC Act itself nor the Deception
Policy requires an individual consumer to have reasonably relied on a particular
deceptive practice. Rather, the policy couches the standard in terms of whether a
practice is “likely to mislead” consumers “acting reasonably under the
circumstances,” which can include irrational actions by particularly vulnerable
consumers.136
The ALEC Model Act’s “reasonable reliance” requirement would be all the
more problematic in the case of unfair practices. An unfair practice does not
necessarily involve a misrepresentation that can be relied on in the same way
that deceptive practices might.137 For example, state consumer protection laws
have been applied to abusive debt collection, as well as systematic breach of
contract or price gouging, but such cases could be precluded by a “reasonable
reliance” requirement because such unfair practices are not “relied on” by the
consumer but instead are simply foisted upon the consumer without their
consent.138
Section 1(A) of the Model Act also specifies that a person seeking to
pursue a private right of action must have suffered an “ascertainable loss of
money or property” as a result of their reasonable reliance on an unlawful act or
practice. A general “ascertainable loss” requirement is present in the state
consumer protection statutes of thirty-four states.139 The ALEC version of
“ascertainable loss,” however, is much narrower than the existing laws because it
is limited to losses of money or property.140 This definition of “ascertainable
loss” might not recognize losses suffered by consumers from invasion of
privacy, security breaches involving personal information, or harassment. Even
hard-to-quantify injuries have been sufficient to meet the generally prevailing
“ascertainable loss” provisions, as applied by state courts under existing law. For
example, a Utah customer who alleged that a health club had caused
unsubstantiated negative information to be placed in his credit report suffered an
ascertainable loss because it could result in the consumer paying higher interest
135. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 10. This requirement is quite different
from a requirement of proof of individual reasonable reliance, which is what the ALEC Model Act
seems to require.
136. Id.
137. See Rebecca Eschler Russell, Unlawful Versus Unfair: A Comparative Analysis of
Oregon’s and Connecticut’s Statutes Encouraging Private Attorneys General to Protect
Consumers, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 673, 681–82 (2011).
138. See, e.g., Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 1, 596 N.W.2d 786 (1999)
(abusive debt collection); Schuchmann v. Air Servs. Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 199 S.W.3d
228 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006) (systematic contract breach); Perry Homes v. Alwattari, 33 S.W.3d 376
(Tex. App. 2000) (price gouging).
139. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 5 app. 5A.
140. Model Act, supra note 124.
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on credit cards or other credit transactions.141 As a practical matter, most
plaintiffs bring a lawsuit to collect damages, and thus proof of ascertainable loss
is not necessarily an unreasonable requirement for bringing a suit. It is basically
an issue of standing, which need not be interpreted harshly against the consumer
who suffers a small loss, and should not be limited to a specific loss of money or
property.
Section 1(B) provides for a ten-day prior notice requirement to “give the
prospective defendant an opportunity to confer,” and presumably to attempt to
settle the case.142 Currently, only eleven states have such an advance notice
requirement.143 Advance notice requirements may sound reasonable, but
constitute a special burden on consumer suits not present for other lawsuits.
Failure to provide the notice within the specified time period may result in
dismissal of an otherwise meritorious lawsuit.144 Also, such prior notice allows
businesses engaged in unlawful practices to “pick off” the plaintiffs by providing
restitution to consumers only in those instances when the consumer chooses to
sue.145 Most consumers who suffer relatively small injuries from deceptive or
unfair trade practices do not bother to file a lawsuit.146 With the advance notice
provision proposed by ALEC, a business engaged in systematic law violations
affecting many consumers in small ways can continue its illegal activities until
an actual lawsuit is filed, and then avoid incurring wider liability or establishing
a legal precedent by a pre-suit settlement with the named plaintiff(s). In such a
situation, the individual plaintiff or named plaintiff in a class action may be
compensated, but the other affected consumers are left high and dry because the
potential class relief or deterrent effect of the actual filing of a suit may be lost.
The ALEC Model Act contains several provisions on remedies for
violations that are more restrictive than analogous provisions under existing
laws. For instance, Section 1(A) would limit suits to those seeking to recover as
damages the “out-of-pocket loss the person sustained as a result of such act or
practice.”147 “Out-of-pocket loss” is defined as “no more than the difference
between what the person paid for the product or service and what the product or

141. Andreason v. Felsted, 137 P.3d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
142. Model Act, supra note 124.
143. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 5 app. 5A.
144. Typically, the dismissal allows the consumer plaintiff to re-file the lawsuit after giving
proper notice, but there may be problems with the statute of limitations if the suit is filed close to
the end of the period, which many lawsuits are.
145. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 20
(2009).
146. See Best & Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of
Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 701
(1977); Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 279, 303 (2012).
147. Model Act, supra note 124, § 1(A).
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service was actually worth in the absence of the unlawful act or practice.”148 This
provision, as well as the outright ban on punitive damages contained in Section
1(G), eliminates the availability of meaningful damages to deter future
wrongdoing by the same or other enterprises, even in cases of willful fraud
against the public. It also eliminates the possibility of consequential damages,
which could be quite important in consumer cases where the actual loss in value
of the product or service is far less than the damage caused by the unfair or
deceptive practice. For instance, if exterior siding is sold and installed pursuant
to a misrepresentation that it is waterproof, but in fact is leaky, then under the
ALEC formulation of damages, the consumer would get only the loss in value of
the price of the siding, and would not be compensated for having to remove and
replace the siding and repair the damage caused by the leaks.149 This approach to
damages also completely eliminates the possibility of compensation for mental
anguish, or pain and suffering. While it is rare for consumers to collect damages
for mental anguish or pain and suffering under current state UDAP statutes,
some states will award such damages in cases of deliberate fraud.150 Thus, the
ALEC Model Act unnecessarily takes away the flexibility for courts to
adequately compensate consumers in extreme cases.
An alternative section in the ALEC model act (Sections 1(C), (D) and (E)),
provides an option for state legislatures to retain treble damages, but limited to
cases where the unlawful act or practice was “willful with the purpose of
deceiving the public,” and with a ceiling of $500 per person.151 Many existing
state UDAP statutes currently provide for multiple or minimum damages.152
Some provisions are tied to a showing of a willful violation, or a particularly
vulnerable class of victims.153 However, they are not capped at levels as low as
the ALEC provision. The Model Act’s limitations on damages are such that any
damage award would be only a “slap on the wrist” that would not be effective
for deterring future unfair or deceptive practices or for adequately compensating
consumers. By contrast, the existing statutory damage provisions (and punitive

148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Robinson Machinery Co. v. Davis, 689 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App. 1985) (finding
consequential damages for consumer when faulty car repair caused continuing damage). See also
CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR & DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 12.3.3
(8th ed. 2012).
150. See, e.g., Dan Boone Mitsubishi, Inc. v. Ebrom, 830 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App. 1992)
(finding a truck driver who was deprived of his livelihood and humiliated by the inability to repay
his debts because of the purchase of a defective truck from an intentionally misrepresenting dealer
entitled to recover mental anguish damages under the Texas consumer protection law).
151. Model Act, supra note 124, § 1(C).
152. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 6 app. 6A.
153. Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(b) provides for up to a $5,000 damage remedy to elderly or
handicapped consumers.
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damages in some states) can be used for punishment or deterrence of
wrongdoers.154
Section 1(F) provides for class actions under the state consumer protection
act, but limits such actions to those who show both individual reasonable
reliance on the challenged act or practices and ascertainable loss.155 Also, the
section eliminates statutory damages for class actions, even in states that adopt
the option for $500 maximum statutory damages in Section 1(C), because
Section 1(F) specifically limits class action damages to actual out-of-pocket
loss.156 Most state courts dealing with class actions under their state UDAP
statutes, however, have held that where a common scheme is alleged, there is no
need for an individual showing of reliance. Rather the class may show that a
reasonable person would have relied on the alleged misrepresentations.157 By
requiring a showing of individual reasonable reliance and ascertainable loss for
class actions under the ALEC model law, the law virtually guarantees that no
class actions will be viable because these elements will vary from individual to
individual and the class may not be able to satisfy the requirement of the
predominance of common questions of law and fact. ALEC’s proposed limit of
class damages to out-of-pocket losses would also severely discourage class
actions in situations where large numbers of consumers were defrauded in ways
that resulted in relatively small individual losses.158 If each member of a class
would thus be entitled to collect perhaps $1.00 each, the costs of processing such
awards might outweigh any benefits. And yet if class actions were prevented
under the ALEC Model Act due to the small size of the individual losses, the
enterprise engaging in a series of small deceptions would be able to pocket the
sum total of the small losses, which could be substantial.
Section 2(A) of the ALEC Model Act allows for attorney’s fees to a
prevailing consumer plaintiff, but only if the court or “trier of fact” (e.g.,
arbitrator) finds that the defendant’s use or employment of the unlawful act or
practice was “willful with the purpose of deceiving the public.”159 This provision
alone is likely to greatly reduce the utility of the state consumer protection laws
154. Nine consumer protection statutes specifically authorize the award of punitive damages,
including those of California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Missouri, Oregon and Rhode Island. See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, § 6:16.
155. The reasonable reliance and ascertainable loss requirements are incorporated into the
class action by language stating that persons bringing a class action have to be entitled to bring an
action under Subsection A, which requires those elements. Model Act, supra note 124, § 1(E).
156. Id. § 1(F).
157. See, e.g., Dix v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 415 N.W.2d 206 (Mich.
1987) (involving fraudulent sale of tax-sheltered annuity policies); Latman v. Costa Cruise Lines,
N.V., 758 So.2d 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding reliance and damages did not have to be
shown individually, but only that a “reasonable consumer” would have been deceived, in case
involving misrepresentation of “port charges” by cruise line).
158. See, e.g., Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981) (involving actual
out-of-pocket loss of fifty cents for handling and postage for 180,000 consumers who did not
receive the promised prize from the advertiser).
159. Model Act, supra note 124, § 2(A).
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to consumer plaintiffs, especially individual plaintiffs. Presently, forty-five state
consumer protection statutes provide for attorney’s fees to the prevailing
consumer plaintiff.160 Twenty-one of these statutes actually mandate that the
court award attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff, while twenty-three provide
that the court award attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff at the court’s
discretion.161 A 2008 study asked groups of both consumers and attorneys
whether they would be discouraged from bringing what they viewed as strong
meritorious claims if the attorney’s fee award was discretionary rather than
mandatory. The results showed that both groups would be less willing to bring
such claims if the attorney’s fee provision was discretionary rather than
mandatory.162 Requiring that plaintiffs show a willful act intended to deceive the
public to recover attorney’s fees will place an even higher barrier to meritorious
suits than merely having a discretionary fee award and thus would likely be even
more discouraging to potential attorneys for consumer plaintiffs.
ALEC’s proposed attorney’s fee award, contingent on a showing of
willfulness and intent to deceive the public, is tantamount to no fee award at all,
without which private consumer UDAP suits are not likely to be filed.163 The
requirement of a willful act increases the burden of proof.164 It would be very
difficult to prove a “willful” act because the consumer has no access to a
merchant’s intent without costly discovery. This requirement also increases the
risk to the attorney who takes a consumer plaintiff’s case. Such attorneys will
have to weigh the possibility that they could win the suit and yet still not get paid
if they cannot prove the requisite willfulness with intent to deceive the public.
The Model Act’s provision on attorney’s fees appears to be a back door method
of incorporating a “public interest” requirement into the statute, since a plaintiff
who wants attorney’s fees would have to show a “purpose of deceiving the
public” and not just an individual.165 Requiring demonstration of a purpose to
deceive the public, analogous to the general public interest requirement, tends to
eliminate individual suits by consumers harmed in one-on-one transactions.166
160. CARTER, supra note 145.
161. See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical
Analysis of Attorney’s Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483,
484–85 (2008).
162. See id. at 514–15.
163. For instance, the Wyoming state UDAP statute provides for attorney’s fees to the
prevailing plaintiff only in class actions, not for individual suits. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-108.
Although the statute has been on the books since 1973, there has been only a single reported case
of a private suit under this statute. See St. John v. Wagner, 302 P.3d 906 (Wyo. 2013) (determining
applicable statute of limitations).
164. North Carolina is the only state that has deemed it necessary to limit consumer plaintiff
attorney’s fee provisions to cases of willful unlawful acts. Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397
(N.C. 1981) (discussing N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-16.1).
165. Only a few states currently require consumer plaintiffs in state UDAP cases to show that
their case will benefit the “public interest.” See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, § 5:5.
166. For a discussion of the adverse effect of the general public interest requirement, see
Prentiss Cox, Goliath Has the Slingshot: Public Benefit and Private Enforcement of Minnesota

PRIDGEN_9.13.15_FINALFIXED_AN&CG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION

9/15/15 12:07 AM

309

The requirement of a finding of intent to “deceive” the public may also eliminate
attorney’s fees for cases that involve unfair, but not necessarily deceptive
practices.
Section 3 of the ALEC Model Act has a limitation of actions (statute of
limitations) of one year from the date of discovery by the person bringing the
action.167 The existing state consumer protection statutes have statutes of
limitation ranging from one year (six states) to two years (ten states) to three or
four years (fifteen states).168 ALEC’s suggested one year from discovery limit is
harsh enough in itself, yet the ALEC statute of limitations section contains an
additional restriction that states: “in no event may any action be brought under
this chapter more than four years after the first instance of the act or practice
giving rise to the cause of action.”169 Thus, a consumer who had been harassed
by a debt collector for more than four years would not be able to bring a suit
even though the same party was still currently harassing her. Also, a natural
reading of this phrase leads to the conclusion that the statute of limitations starts
to run when the seller first instituted the practice, even though it may not have
affected the individual bringing suit until much later, possibly later than four
years. This unusual way of applying a statute of limitations means that a
merchant who escaped suit for more than four years for the same illegal practice
would in effect get a “free pass” from private suits.
Section 4 of the ALEC model law provides for some exemptions to the
scope of the act. While these types of exemptions are common in some form or
another in many state UDAP statutes, the ALEC exemption for regulated
practices is so sweeping that it comes close to providing immunity for almost
any business practice. Many state laws currently exempt acts or practices
“specifically required or permitted” by state or federal law.170 ALEC’s Section
4(A)(1), however, would exempt “[a]cts or practices required or permitted by or
in accord with state or federal law, rule or regulation, judicial or administrative
decision, or formal or informal agency action.”171 This could be interpreted to
exempt any activity not addressed by current law, since by definition, such a
practice would be permitted. The reference to judicial or administrative decisions
would also provide legal cover for any practice that has been permitted, even
indirectly, by any court or agency decision involving similar practices by
different entities. Finally, the exemption based on “informal agency action”

Consumer Protection Laws, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163, 210–11 (2006); Prentiss Cox,
CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE TRADE REGULATION IN MINNESOTA § 4.1C2(a) M.S.B.A.
(2009).
167. Model Act, supra note 124, § 3.
168. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, ch. 6 app. 6A.
169. Model Act, supra note 124, § 3.
170. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-7, as applied in Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
227 P.3d 73 (N.M. 2010) (using the modified language “expressly permitted”). See generally
PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 19, §§ 4:32–33, app. 4A.
171. Model Act, supra note 124, § 4(A)(1).
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opens the door to claims that unfair or deceptive actions were blessed by a
statement made by low-level agency staff, and are thus exempt.
V.
CONCLUSION
I have asserted in this article that the Model Act on Private Enforcement of
Consumer Protection Statutes put forth by the industry-funded think tank ALEC
is unnecessary to correct abuses, real or perceived, and in fact would undermine
over forty years of consumer protection embodied in the state unfair and
deceptive trade practices acts. The state UDAP statutes, which originated in the
late 1960s and were passed by most states in the early 1970s, function as
extensions of the enforcement power of the FTC through state legislation. The
laws provide consumers who have relatively small claims with access to the
courts for redress against unfair and deceptive trade practices. Yet in the past
decade, some critics have come forward to question the wisdom of the state
UDAP laws, particularly the private enforcement aspect. These “reform”
proponents argue that state consumer litigation has strayed from what the FTC
would have done, has resulted in costs to businesses which then raised consumer
prices, and triggered an explosion of litigation.
In response to this wave of criticism, the ALEC Model Act contains a wide
array of limitations to private suits, each of which favors the business defendant
and constrains the consumer plaintiff. The section-by-section analysis in this
article demonstrates how the Model Act differs from current law on almost every
count, and in ways that undermine the private right of action, rather than just
eliminating abuse. The analysis also demonstrates that the justifications for this
cutback of the state statutes are spurious. On the other hand, ALEC’s proffered
“fix” will gut the consumer protection provisions under these well-founded state
statutes that underlie the access to justice that consumers have benefitted from
for nearly fifty years.
It may be tempting for state legislators to respond to these calls to “reform”
their state consumer protection acts. After all, each provision, when viewed in
isolation and without probing by consumer advocates, may seem tolerable or
justifiable, i.e., just some minor repairs or tidying up. Perhaps one could argue
that requiring a showing of “reasonable” reliance is indeed reasonable and
prevents any possibility of overcompensation. Perhaps an “ascertainable loss”
requirement seems logical since no one is in favor of frivolous suits, and the
ALEC version of ascertainable loss of money or property at first seems harmless.
A ten-day notice requirement could be viewed as preventing ill-considered suits
and encouraging settlements. Limiting damages to consumers’ out-of-pocket
loss? It could tamp down outrageous verdicts. Putting a low limit on statutory
damages? Again, some would say, “why not?” as statutory damages by
definition are not the same as actual damages. Slamming the brakes on consumer
class actions could be seen as a way of pushing back against greedy lawyers.
Along those lines, a provision requiring a showing of public harm in order to
make the defendant pay the consumer plaintiff’s attorney’s fees could seem
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reasonable, because if the suit only helps one consumer then some may argue
that the consumer should pay for her own attorney. A one-year limit on bringing
suit may seem like plenty of time, and if no one has sued the merchant for four
years, then maybe the merchant has come to think his or her actions are lawful.
And if an action is permitted by another law or by implication, then why should
a business enterprise be penalized?
However, I have shown in the section-by-section analysis that these
suggested reforms significantly undermine the consumer’s ability to sue and to
achieve adequate compensation under state consumer protection law. Virtually
every one of the suggested ALEC provisions tends to favor business defendants
and function to the detriment of potential consumer plaintiffs.172 If all of the
ALEC Model provisions were enacted, the result would be to gut private UDAP
actions, with their benefits to consumers and to society, while not requiring state
legislators to transparently explain a repeal of the consumer’s right to sue. This
sledgehammer approach is both uncalled for and unnecessary.
State legislators should take a moment to contemplate whether sweeping
changes to their existing consumer protection statutes are in the public interest
before taking any drastic actions. Rather than accepting ALEC’s proposed
changes carte blanche, lawmakers should engage with both business and
consumer advocates to assure themselves that they understand the full
implications of these proposals. They should not be fooled into thinking the
ALEC Model Act is merely a law reform measure. It is in fact a wrecking ball
that will demolish a critical aspect of the structure of consumer protection in the
United States.

172. See supra Table 1: Comparison of ALEC Model Law to Current Law.

